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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
MARK VII FINANCIAL 
CONSULTANTS CORPORATION, 
Plaintiff-Appellant, 
vs. 
DALE SMEDLEY and THE FIRST 
NATIONAL BANK OF LAYTON, 
Defendants-Appellees. 
Case No. 880606-CA 
Category 14b 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS BELOW 
This is an appeal in a civil case from the Amended Judgment 
on the Verdict entered on June 23, 1988, following a jury trial. 
(R. 483-85.) Plaintiff filed its Notice of Appeal on July 12, 
1988. (R. 490-91.) The Supreme Court had jurisdiction pursuant 
to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(3) (i) (1988). The Supreme Court 
poured this case over to this Court pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 
78-2-2(4) on October 19, 1988. This Court has jurisdiction 
pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(h). 
DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, ETC. 
Appellant does not believe that any constitutional provi-
sions, statutes, ordinances, rules or regulations are determina-
tive of the issues raised herein. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A, Nature Of The Case. This is a civil case for conver-
sion and for breach of contract. 
B. Course Of Proceedings And Disposition Below, Plain-
tiff filed its Complaint in the Third Judicial District Court of 
Salt Lake County on July 31, 1985. (R. 5-11.) By stipulation 
of the parties, venue of the case was transferred to the Second 
Judicial District Court of Davis County. (R. 2-4.) Plaintiff 
filed an Amended Complaint on August 15, 1986. (R. 85-94.) The 
defendants each filed answers to the Amended Complaint. 
(Smedley, R. 95-101; First National Bank of Layton, R. 102-07.) 
On May 23, 1986, plaintiff filed a Motion for Partial Sum-
mary Judgment (R. 51-52), and on March 23, 1987, filed a Review-
ed [sic: Renewed] and Amended Motion for Partial Summary 
Judgment. (R. 113-14.) The Court thereafter entered an Order 
determining that Smedley, who had made a bid on the subject 
property at a sale held by the bank, had thereby only redeemed 
the property as a secured party and did not take pursuant to 
that sale, and that Smedleyfs acquisition of the collateral did 
not destroy the ownership interest of the plaintiff. The court 
otherwise denied plaintiff's Motions for Summary Judgment. (R. 
174-75; 177-80.) 
The case was tried before a jury on March 30, April 1, and 
April 4, 1988. At the conclusion of trial, the jury returned a 
verdict, a copy of which is attached hereto in Appendix A, 
awarding damages in favor of plaintiff and against Smedley and 
the bank for $586.00, and against Smedley only for $30,586.00. 
(R. 439-41.) A Judgment on Verdict was entered on April 18, 
1988. (R. 442-44.) 
2 
On the same day as the entry of the Judgment on Verdict, 
plaintiff filed a Motion for Judgment N.O.V. (R. 429-31), a 
Motion for Judgment and Interest (R. 432-33), a Motion for 
Attorney's Fees and Costs (R. 434-35), and a Motion for a New 
Trial or for an Additur. (R. 436-38.) After hearing, the court 
augmented the judgment in the amount of $250.00, granted 
plaintiff pre-judgment interest, costs and attorney's fees 
against Smedley, and otherwise denied plaintiff's motions. (R. 
486-88.) An Amended Judgment on the Verdict reflecting the 
disposition of plaintiff's post-trial motions was entered on 
June 23, 1988. (R. 483-85.) Plaintiff filed its Notice of 
Appeal on July 12, 1988. (R. 490-91.) 
C. Statement Of Facts. The dispute in this case centers 
around a 1973 Chicago pneumatic drill rig mounted on a 1973 
International truck ("drill rig"), which served as collateral 
for a promissory note executed by plaintiff in favor of General 
Electric Credit Corporation ("GECC"). Payment of the note was 
guaranteed by defendant Dale Smedley. (Plaintiff's Exhibit 4.) 
The transactions that led to the signing of the promissory 
note started sometime prior to October, 1983. Smedley owned 
approximately 200 acres of land in Morgan County, Utah, subject 
to a mortgage in favor of GECC in the approximate amount of 
$112,500.00. Smedley and plaintiff entered into negotiations 
under which the parties would form a joint venture with plain-
tiff infusing capital and the parties developing the property. 
(Plaintiff's Exhibit 1.) The negotiations culminated in an 
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agreement dated June 8, 1984, under which plaintiff paid 
$100,000.00 cash to GECC and executed a promissory note for the 
balance due on the mortgage. (The promissory note was for 
$13,250.00.) The promissory note was secured by the drill rig 
and by the personal guarantee of Smedley. (Plaintiff's Exhibit 
2; R. 277-78.) Smedley executed a bill of sale to the drilling 
rig conveying title to the plaintiff. (Plaintiff's Exhibit 3.) 
Smedley, however, had the right to reacquire title to the drill 
rig by performing $65,000.00 worth of work towards developing 
the 200 acres of real property. (R. 278; Plaintiff's Exhibit 
2.) Actual possession of the drill rig, however, at all times 
remained with Smedley. (R. 201, 279.) 
The promissory note became due on January 1, 1985 (Plain-
tiff's Exhibit 4), and plaintiff did not make the payment. (R. 
279.) At the request of Smedley, the First National Bank of 
Layton ("bank") purchased the position of GECC in the promissory 
note, chattel mortgage and guaranty agreement. (R. 201-02; 
Defendant's Exhibits 14, 15.) Smedley was indebted to the bank 
for an amount far in excess of the value of the drilling rig (R. 
202) and worked with the bank to develop a plan to obtain the 
equity in the drilling rig and apply it against Smedley's loan 
with the bank. (R. 279.) The bank sent a notice to plaintiff 
of its intention to dispose of the drilling rig, and asserted in 
the notice that the amount necessary to redeem the collateral 
was the outstanding principal and interest, together with costs 
of repossession and sale and attorney's fees. (Plaintiff's 
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Exhibit 7.) In response to the notice, plaintiff submitted a 
written tender offering to pay the amount of the principal and 
interest to redeem the collateral. (Plaintiff's Exhibit 8.) 
The bank did not respond to the tender. (R. 202.) The bank 
proceeded with its sale, and at the sale, Smedley redeemed the 
collateral for the amount demanded by the bank. (R. 175, 178, 
202.) 
In accordance with his prior understanding with the bank, 
Smedley thereafter sold the drilling rig to a third party and 
paid the surplus proceeds from the sale to the bank for applica-
tion against his outstanding indebtedness. (R. 203.) Neither 
Smedley nor the bank gave any notice to plaintiff prior to the 
sale by Smedley. (Id.) 
Plaintiff filed this action to recover damages for 
Smedley's and the bank's conversion of his property. (R. 85-94.) 
Smedley filed an answer raising several affirmative defenses and 
also claiming a right of setoff for the work he had performed on 
the 200 acres of property. (R. 106.) The bank filed an answer 
but did not assert a right to setoff in its answer. (R. 95-
101.) 
The jury found that both the bank and Smedley had converted 
plaintiff's property. The jury found plaintiff's damages by 
reason of the conversion to be $30,586. The jury further found 
that Smedley had performed $20,139.00 worth of work on the 2 00 
acres of property, and granted Smedley a setoff for that amount 
and for the amount Smedley had paid to the bank on the GECC 
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note. (R. 441.) The jury, however, also granted the bank a 
setoff for the same amounts. (Id.; R. 483-85.) Plaintiff 
thereafter perfected this appeal. (R. 490-91.) 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The jury found that the bank had converted plaintiff's 
property and that the damages caused to plaintiff by the 
conversion were $30,586.00. The jury setoff against that 
judgment, however, and indebtedness owned by plaintiff to 
another party. The setoff was contrary to the jury instruc-
tions. In addition, the setoff was contrary to law. Setoffs 
may only be allowed as between parties with a mutuality of 
obligation. 
The trial court also erred in failing to instruct the jury 
of the issue of punitive damages. The evidence presented to the 
jury established, and the jury found, that the bank and Smedley 
entered into a conspiracy to intentionally deprive plaintiff of 
the equity in his property. The conduct was wilful and mali-
cious, and an instruction on punitive damages should have been 
given. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE JURY AND THE TRIAL COURT ERRED 
IN ALLOWING THE BANK A SETOFF FOR AN OBLIGATION 
OWED TO SMEDLEY ONLY. 
Plaintiff established at trial that the bank and Smedley 
had agreed and conspired between themselves to deprive plaintiff 
of its equity in the drilling rig and to apply that equity in 
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partial satisfaction of Smedley's obligation to the bank. The 
jury found the facts as contended by plaintiff, and awarded a 
judgment against both Smedley and the bank for conversion. The 
jury determined plaintiff's damages from the conversion to be 
$30,586.00, but then, in a hand-written addendum to its verdict, 
proceeded to take away what it had given by allowing an improper 
setoff against the judgment. The jury allowed the bank a setoff 
based on an obligation owed by plaintiff to Smedley. The 
allowance of this setoff was contrary to the express instruc-
tions given to the jury, and also contrary to the established 
law concerning the subject. 
A. The Jury Instructions Precluded Allowing a Setoff to 
the Bank. 
The instructions to the jury regarding plaintiff's 
claims against the bank are set forth predominately in instruc-
tions 29, 30, 31, and 36a, copies of which are set forth in the 
appendix as Items C, D, E, and F, respectively.1 The measure of 
damages against the bank was set forth in Instruction No. 31 as 
follows: 
In the event you find the bank has conspired 
with Smedley has heretofore instructed, you 
should also enter judgment against the bank 
for the amount of any judgment against 
Smedley for conversion or wrongful sale. 
This instruction essentially provides that the bank and 
Smedley would be jointly and severally liable for any damages 
1
 A complete list of the substantive jury instructions 
(omitting the stock instructions) appears in Appendix G. 
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awarded to plaintiff for conversion. In other words, the jury 
could not find both Smedley and the bank guilty of conversion, 
but find that plaintiff fs damages as a result of the conversion 
by the bank was "x" dollars, while plaintiff's damages as a 
result of conversion by Smedley was "ylf dollars. The award of 
damages had to the same against each defendant. Other instruc-
tions permitted the jury to grant Smedley a setoff for any 
amounts which plaintiff owed Smedley. (E.g.. Instructions 24, 25 
(R. 408-09).) No instruction, however, authorized any setoff 
against the damages found against the bank. 
On the second page of its verdict (R. 440), the jury found 
that plaintiff was entitled to an award of damages against 
Smedley in the sum of $30,586.00. Pursuant to the clear terms 
of instruction No. 31, the jury was required, upon finding that 
the bank participated in the conversion, to find a verdict 
against the bank in the same amount of $3 0,586.00.2 The case 
should be remanded to the trial court with instructions to enter 
judgment against the bank for the sum of $30,836.00. 
B. The Bank Was Not Entitled to a Setoff Based on 
Smedley's Claims Against Plaintiff. 
Setoff is an equitable doctrine, allowed when two 
parties are each indebted to the other on separate claims. 
Under the circumstances, justice requires that the debts be 
2
 Pursuant to plaintiff's Motion for Judgment N.O.V., the 
Court did grant an additur in the amount of $250.00, so the 
amount of the judgment against Smedley and the bank should have 
been $30,836.00. (R. 487). 
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setoff and only the difference between the debts recovered. 
International Equipment Service, Inc. v. Pocatello Industrial 
Park Co., 107 Idaho 1116, 695 P.2d 1255, 1258 (1985); 20 Am. 
Jur. 2d Counterclaim, Recoupment, and Setoff § 7 (1965). Setoff 
is only allowed, however, where there is a mutuality of obliga-
tion. First Security Bank of Utah v. Utah Turkey Growers, Inc., 
610 P.2d 329, 333 (Utah 1980). Stated another way, a party may 
not obtain the benefit of a setoff unless that party could have 
maintained a direct action for the amount of the setoff. Seal 
v. Tavco. Inc., 116 Utah 2d 323, 400 P.2d 503, 505 (1965) 
(M[A]llowance of damages on a counterclaim by way of setoff is 
tantamount to a suit on such cause of action."); Occidental 
Chemical Co. v. Connor, 124 Ariz. 341, 604 P.2d 605, 607 (1979) 
("If one is not entitled to relief in a direct action, he is not 
entitled to assert a setoff or counterclaim."). 
In the instant case, the setoff allowed to the bank was 
based on the amounts which plaintiff owed to Smedley for work 
Smedley had performed in development of the 200 acre parcel of 
property. The claim arose pursuant to a contract between 
plaintiff and Smedley. It is clear that the bank could not have 
maintained a direct action against plaintiff based on that 
contract. Where the bank could not have maintained a direct 
action against plaintiff, it follows that the bank is not 
entitled to the benefit of setoff for that same obligation. 
As set forth above, the instructions to the jury did not 
allow the bank a right of setoff for the obligations owed by 
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plaintiff to Smedley. To the extent that the instructions can 
be read as allowing such a right of setoff, they are clearly 
erroneous. It is possible that the jury misunderstood the 
instructions. It is clear in any event, however, that the jury 
found that plaintiff was damaged in the amount of $30,586.00 
(augmented to $30,836.00 pursuant to plaintiff's Motion for 
Judgment N.O.V.), but then allowed the bank a setoff against 
that amount based on claims owed by plaintiff to Smedley. The 
allowance of the setoff was error, and the case should be 
remanded for entry of judgment against the bank in the amount of 
$30,836.00. 
POINT II 
PLAINTIFF WAS ENTITLED TO AN INSTRUCTION 
ON PUNITIVE DAMAGES. 
Plaintiff's amended complaint prayed for an award of 
punitive damages (R. 94), and plaintiff requested that the jury 
be instructed concerning punitive damages. (R. 336-37.) The 
trial court denied plaintiff's requested instructions, and 
instructed the jury that no punitive damages could be awarded. 
(R. 417.) 
In order to give rise to punitive damages, a defendant's 
conduct must be both wilful and malicious. The defendant must 
have demonstrated a knowing and reckless disregard toward the 
rights of others. Johnson v. Rogers, 90 Utah Adv. Rep. 3, 4 
(1988)(citations omitted). Plaintiff acknowledges that in order 
to recover punitive damages, it was required to show more than 
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mere conversion. Amoss v. Broadbent, 30 Utah 165, 514 P.2d 1284 
(1973). 
In the instant case, however, the jury found that the bank 
had converted plaintiff's property, in accordance with the 
following instruction: 
If you find for the plaintiff on either 
plaintiff's claim for conversion or wrongful 
sale, before you may find that the bank 
conspired with Smedley you must find that 
defendant Smedley and the bank entered into 
a mutual agreement expressly or impliedly to 
pursue a joint enterprise to convert the rig 
or to conduct a wrongful sale of the rig in 
which they both engaged. With both acting 
in pursuit of that common purpose, so that 
each is acting for both in furthering it. 
Jury Instruction 30 (R. 414). 
The jury found, therefore, that the bank intentionally 
entered into an agreement with Smedley for the express purpose 
of wrongfully depriving plaintiff of his equity in the property. 
This is sufficient to support an award of punitive damages, and 
the jury should have been so instructed. 
CONCLUSION 
The instructions given to the jury and established case law 
prohibit allowing the bank a setoff for amounts owed by plain-
tiff to Smedley. The entry of the judgment allowing such a 
setoff was in error. This case should be remanded with instruc-
tions to enter a judgment in favor of plaintiff and against the 
First National Bank of Lay ton in the sum of $30,836.00, plus 
costs and interests as provided by law. 
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Plaintiff was entitled to an instruction on punitive 
damages, and the case should be remanded for a new trial on the 
issue of punitive damages. 
DATED this 9th day of November, 1988. 
JACKSON HOWARD, 
D. DAVID LAMBERT, and 
LESLIE W. SLAUGH, for: 
HOWARD, LEWIS & PETERSEN 
tprneys for/Appellant 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that four true and correct copies of the 
foregoing were mailed to the following, postage prepaid, this 
9th day of November, 1988. 
DAVID E. BEAN 
BEAN & SMEDLEY 
190 South Fort Lane Suite 2 
Layton, Utah 84041 
WILLIAM THOMAS THURMAN 
SCOTT C. PIERCE 
MCKAY, BURTON & THURMAN 
Kennecott Building Suite 1200 
Salt Lake City^,—Utah 841? 
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APPENDIX "A" 
Jury Verdict (R.439-41) 
IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR DAVIS COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
O 4»* r - - "J, , . \ ^ ^' • . w . 
I3E3 APR - 5 p!f \2: 3 0 
C4<w u
*°»«*^» CuUsr 
SY />£_ 
MARK VII FINANCIAL, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. ! 
DALE SMEDLEY, and 
FIRST NATIONAL BANK OF LAYTON, ] 
Defendants. ] 
1 Civil Action No. 
1 VERDICT 
40864 
WE THE JURY empanelled in the above entitled matter 
Find the issues in favor of the plaintiff and against the 
defendants Smedley and the Bank and award damages as follows: 
5~2(* CDO 
Signed this M day of April, 1988. 
V-J2^s>.CJ2, 
Foreperson 
FJLlWSD 
IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR DAVIS COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
MARK VII FINANCIAL, ] 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
DALE SMEDLEY, and 
FIRST NATIONAL BANK OF LAYTON, ] 
Defendants. 
1
 Civil Action No. 
' VERDICT 
40864 
WE THE JURY empaneled in the above entitled matter, 
Find the issues in favor of the plaintiff and against the 
defendant Smedley and award damages in the following sum: 
<W>c 
U?b^ 
« <*o 
-> 
-&&& -SS 3c^G"gl.— 
Signed this M day of April, 1988. 
VJ^J?S ,G& 
Foreperson 
Cto^WEfeSlcaO 
/ 4
 ; 27S". ^2 
20 - /3 *? . <$£ 
APPENDIX "B" 
Amended Judgment on the Verdict 
(R. 483-85) 
JACKSON HOWARD, (A 1548) for: 
HOWARD, LEWIS & PETERSEN 
ATTORNEYS AND COUNSELORS AT LAW 
120 East 300 North Street 
P.O. Box 778 
Provo, Utah 84603 
Telephone: (801) 373-6345 
m
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 A » 06 
Our File No. 16,607 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF DAVIS COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
MARK VII FINANCIAL CONSULTANTS 
CORPORATION, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
DALE SMEDLEY and FIRST NATIONAL 
BANK OF LAYTON, 
Defendants. 
AMENDED JUDGMENT 
ON THE VERDICT 
Civil No. 40864 
Judge Rodney S. Page 
The above-captioned matter came on for its regularly scheduled trial beginning 
on March 30, 1988, continuing on April 1, and again continuing on April 4, 1988. The 
Hon. Rodney S. Page presided over the trial, and the matter was tried to a duly 
impaneled jury consisting of eight members. At the conclusion of the evidence, the 
jury was instructed on the law and thereafter, the jury received the arguments of 
counsel. The jury, through its foreperson, Michael S. Cole, returned its verdict and 
based upon said verdict, and with the amendments the Court has made by separate 
Order, the Court now makes and enters the following judgment on the verdict: 
UCGSX'T EHB® VLM 
1. The defendants jointly converted the property of the plaintiff damaging 
the plaintiff as set forth hereafter. 
2. Damages were calculated against the bank and the defendant Smedley, 
jointly and severally, for conversion as follows: 
a. Value of property converted: $ 35,000.00; 
b. Monies owed on the property: ($14,025.00); 
c. Offset for work performed by Smedley: ($20,139.00); 
Total: $ 836.00. 
3. In addition, the jury found damages against defendant Dale Smedley for 
conversion in the sum of $30,836.00. 
4. The plaintiff is granted judgment against The First National Bank of 
Layton in the amount of $836.00 and interest in the amount of $247.32 and costs in the 
amount of $479.45. 
5. The plaintiff is granted judgment against Dale Smedley in the amount of 
$30,836.00, plus interest in the amount of $11,691.98, attorney's fees in the amount of 
$20,000.00, and costs in the amount of $479.45. 
DATED at Farmington, Utah, this tt- day of June, 1988. 
BY THE COURT: 
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APPENDIX "C" 
I n s t r u c t i o n No. 29 
(R. 413) 
INSTRUCTION NO. Ol 
You are instructed that the Court has determined as 
a matter of law that the bank did not conduct a private sale, 
but rather, the action of Smedley in purchasing the drill rig 
on April 29, 1985, was a redemption that did not cut off the 
rights of Mark VII• You are, therefore, instructed that if you 
find that the bank at the time of the receipt of the money from 
Doxey, May 3, 1985, knew that Smedley had redeemed as guarantor, 
knew that he did not have' a right to sell the rig so as to 
extinguish the interest of Mark VII and retain the proceeds. 
Then the act of the bank in taking Doxey1s money and crediting 
the account of Smedley was an act of conversion of the property 
interest of Mark VII. 
APPENDIX "D" 
I n s t r u c t i o n No. 30 
(R. 414) 
INSTRUCTION NO. 3^ 
If you find for the plaintiff on either plaintiff's 
claim for conversion or wrongful sale, before you may find that 
the bank conspired with Smedley you must find that defendant 
Smedley and the bank entered into a mutual agreement expressly 
or impliedly to pursue a joint enterprise to convert the rig 
or to conduct a wrongful sale of the rig in which they both 
engaged. With both acting in pursuit of that common purpose, 
so that each is acting for both in furthering it. 
The plaintiff must prove this proposition be a 
preponderance of the evidence. 
APPENDIX "E" 
I n s t r u c t i o n No. 31 
(R. 415) 
INSTRUCTION NO. Q\ 
In the event you find the bank has conspired with 
Smedley as heretofore instructed, you should also enter judgment 
against the bank for the amount of any judgment against Smedley 
for conversion or wrongful sale. 
APPENDIX "F" 
I n s t r u c t i o n No. 36a 
(R. 421) 
INSTRUCTION NO. 3fa 
You are instructed that you may find in favor of the 
plaintiff and against the defendant Smedley and reach a verdict 
consistant with these instructions. You may also find in favor 
of the plaintiff and against both defendants consistent with 
these instructions so as to return two consistent verdicts in 
favor of the plaintiff, however, if you find against Smedley in 
both instances the amount of the joint verdict against both 
Smedley and the Bank will be deducted by the Court from the 
amount you award in the verdict form against Smedley alone so as 
to prevent a double recovery. 
Nothing contained herein requires that you do either or 
both and you are instructed that you are free to return a verdict 
as you see fit based upon the evidence and facts as you find them 
under the law. 

APPENDIX "G" 
List of Substantive Jury Instructions 
SUMMARY OF SUBSTANTIVE JURY INSTRUCTIONS 
14. Claims of the parties 
15. Written agreements are ambiguous 
15a Ambiguity construed against drafter 
16. Elements of breach of contract claim against Smedley 
17. Elements of conversion 
18. Smedley redeemed rig from Bank 
19. Requirements of commercially reasonable sale 
20. Elements of wrongful sale claim against Smedley 
21. Elements of Smedley's breach of agreement claim against plaintiff 
22. Smedley entitled to reasonable value of services 
23. Measure of damages for breach of contract against Smedley 
24. Measure of damages for conversion against Smedley 
25. Measure of damages for wrongful sale against Smedley 
26. Waiver and relinquishment defined 
27. Plaintiff had no duty to attend bank's sale 
28. Fair market value of rig was $33,000 plus $2,000 for hammer 
29. Elements of conversion against bank 
30. Elements of conspiracy against bank 
31. Measure of damages against bank (conspiracy to convert) 
36a Effect of verdicts against both bank and Smedley (double recovery) 
